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DE OBLIGATIONE PRINCIPIS 
PROTEGENDI SUBDITOS... 
SOME REMARKS ON RECURSUS AD PRINCIPEM 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between Church and State has been the subject of many studies1. From 
these studies it appears that this relationship can be characterized as ambiguous. On the 
one side, the Church and her social activities were useful to the State. On the other side, the 
Church as a public body was also a competitor for the State. From the Middle Ages 
onwards, the State tried progressively to ‘control’ the Church in these two aspects: on the 
one hand, the State tried to convince the Church to regulate her activities according to the 
views of the State; on the other hand, the State tried to impose itself as the only public 
body. This paper focuses on the legal instruments by which the State tried to control the 
Church in these two aspects. 
The ius placiti must be mentioned first in this respect. As a result of this right, 
ecclesiastical legislation could not be promulgated in a particular territory without the 
consent of the sovereign. In the Low Countries we find several statutes putting forward this 
ius placiti, for example an Ordinance which dates from approximately 15302. From this 
Ordinance it also appears that the ius placiti had been the subject of earlier legislation, for 
it mentions that: 
 
feu de tres digne memoire lEmpereur Maximilien ... en lan 1484, et le roy de Castille Don 
Philippe ... en lan 1497, eussent faict certains edictz et placcaerts, par lesquels ils auroient 
expressement et de leur certaine science interdict, prohibe et deffendu a tous ... de mectre a 
execution esdicts pays de par deca aucunes bulles, reservations, exspectatives, lettres 
executoriales, ne autres collations, ne provisions apostoliques, sur paine de perdre leffect et 
fruict des dites bulles et impetrations, et den estre puniz a lexemple dautres, tant par 
bannissement de nos dits pays de par deca que destre declaire a iamais inhabille de pouvoir 
ioyir ou possesser daucuns benefices ne fruictz diceux esdicts pays, iusques a ce que les 
dictes bulles, provisions et autres impetrations auroyent este veuz en conseil de par deca, et 
sur ce este decrete lettres de consentement et de placet en forme deue. 
 
 
1 E.g. J.-F. LEMARIGNIER, J. GAUDEMET & G. MOLLAT, Institutions ecclésiastiques (Histoire des 
Institutions françaises au Moyen Age, 3), Paris, 1962; I.A. DIEPENHORST, De verhouding tusschen Kerk 
en Staat in Nederland, Utrecht, s.a. [1946]; B. TIERNEY, The Idea of Natural Rights. Studies on Natural 
Rights, Natural Law and Church Law, 1150-1625 (Emory University Studies in Law and Religion, 5), 
Atlanta, 1997. 
2 J. LAMEERE (ed.), Recueil des ordonnances des Pays-Bas. Deuxième série – 1506-1700, vol. III: 
Contenant les ordonnances de 8 janvier 1529 (1530, N.ST.) au 11 décembre 1536, Bruxelles, 1902, pp. 
72-77. 
I shall not focus here on the ius placiti. My attention will be directed to instruments 
curbing the power of the Church which can be brought under the heading of recursus ad 
principem, i.e. a complaint to the secular authorities. It seems natural to speak about this 
subject at a conference devoted to Zeger-Bernard Van Espen, since recursus was an 
important object of study for him. Both his Motivum iuris pro Van de Nesse published in 
1707 and the Tractatus de recursu ad principem, published at the end of Van Espen's life 
in 1725, deal with this subject3. The latter study was very influential, for example in 
Bavaria, where it was taken as the starting-point for legislation on this subject in 17794. 
 
 
II. RECURSUS AD PRINCIPEM 
 
Various authors have written on Van Espen's ideas on recursus5. We find a useful 
summary of the Tractatus in Eichmann's Der recursus ab abusu nach deutschem Recht, a 
volume published in Breslau in 19036. Eichmann is, however, unclear in his terminology. 
He does not explain that recursus ab abusu, which appears in the title of his book, is not a 
synonym for recursus ad principem, the subject of Van Espen's Tractatus. Occasionally 
one gets the impression that this author views both types of recursus as equivalents7. 
Nevertheless, a distinction should be made because recursus ad principem is the general 
expression for all means of recourse to secular authorities in ecclesiastical affairs, whereas 
recursus ab abusu is only a particular type of recursus ad principem. In addition, 
Eichmann does not explain that he uses the terminology recursus ab abusu as the 
equivalent of appellatio (tamquam) ab abusu or appel comme d'abus, a method of filing a 
complaint with a secular court about ecclesiastical affairs developed in late medieval 
France (see infra)8. In Van Espen's Tractatus, this appel comme d'abus is designated a 
remedium cassationis. Another method of filing a complaint with the secular authorities, 
i.e. another type of recursus ad principem, was a possessory action known in the Low 
Countries as (ecclesiastical) maintenue. As will appear later, its French equivalent was 
termed (an ecclesiastical) complainte. 
 
 
3 See also Z.B. VAN ESPEN, Jus Ecclesiasticum Universum, Lovanii, 1700. Cf. J. HALLEBEEK, Recursus 
ad Principem. Zegers Bernard Van Espen on the rôle of secular courts in preventing the abuse of 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, in J. HALLEBEEK & B. WIRIX (eds.), Met het oog op morgen. Ecclesiologische 
beschouwingen aangeboden aan Jan Visser, Zoetermeer, 1996, pp. 64-71, esp. 65. 
4 E. EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu nach deutschem Recht mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des 
bayerischen, preußischen und reichsländischen Kirchenrechts, historisch-dogmatisch dargestellt 
(Untersuchungen zur Deutschen Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte begründet von Otto von Gierke im Jahre 1878, 
66), Breslau, 1903 [= Aalen, 1971], p. 121 ss. On the influence of Van Espen in general, see G. LECLERC, 
Zeger-Bernard Van Espen (1646-1728) et l'autorité ecclésiastique. Contribution à l'histoire des théories 
gallicanes et du jansénisme (Studia et Textus Historiae Juris Canonici, 2), Zürich, 1964, p. 355 ss. 
5 M. NUTTINCK, La vie et l'ceuvre de Zeger-Bernard Van Espen. Un canoniste janséniste, gallican et 
régalien à l'université de Louvain (1646-1728) (Université de Louvain. Recueil de travaux d'histoire et de 
philologie, IVe série, 43), Louvain, 1969, p. 483 ss.; LECLERC, Van Espen et l'autorité ecclésiastique (n. 4), 
p. 315 ss.; HALLEBEEK, Recursus ad Principem (n. 3), p. 64 ss.; M.A.H.P. VAN STIPHOUT, Van de paus 
of van de koning? Zeger-Bernard Van Espen en het appel comme d'abus, in Pro Memorie. Bijdragen tot de 
rechtsgeschiedenis der Nederlanden 1 (1999) 100-114, p. 100 ss. 
6 EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu (n. 4), p. 127 ss. 
7 E.g. EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu (n. 4), pp. 120-121. The same is done by P.G. CARON, 
L'appello per abuso (Raccolta di studi della rivista Il diritto ecclesiastico, 3), Milano, 1954, p. 4: ‘[...] tale 
istituto, che assumeva, a seconda dei paesi e delle epoche, diverse denominazioni (es.: recursus ad 
principem; appellatio ab abusu: «appel comme d'abus» in Francia; «recurso de fuerza» in Ispagna [...])’. 
8 The use of these terms as equivalente appears only implicitly, for example EICHMANN, Der recursus ab 
abusu (n. 4), pp. 100-101. 
1. Appel comme d'abus 
 
The appel comme d'abus was a specific type of appeal, which did not take a case to a 
higher court (appellatio ab inferiore ad superiorem), but from an ecclesiastical court to a 
secular court. Most authors agree that the expression appel comme d'abus first appeared in 
France in the 15th century. According to Eduard Eichmann9, this occurred in the second 
half of the century. Jan Hallebeek and, following him, Maurice van Stiphout10 mention the 
year 1448. But even at this period we do not find the expression used in statutes. Article 69 
of the Ordonnance sur l'administration de la justice, dated Paris July 1493, for example, 
refers to ‘appellations extraordinaires’, where in my opinion appel comme d'abus is 
meant11. 
Eichmann states that although a specific designation may have been lacking before the 
15th century, the theory and practice of appellatio ab abusu are much older; in his opinion 
traces of appel comme d'abus can be found in the 13th and 14th centuries12. In support of 
this view Eichmann refers to early measures of the secular authorities taken against 
excommunications which, according to these authorities, had been pronounced unjustly. 
Eichmann also mentions orders of the royal court directed to ecclesiastical courts to stop 
taking cognizance of a particular matter13. 
One of the first French statutes containing references to appel comme d'abus is the 
Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts (1539)14. From the way the references are phrased, it 
appears that the designation appel comme d'abus was readily understood by 
contemporaries. Article 5 contains the rule that appel comme d'abus does not suspend the 
procedure before the ecclesiastical court ‘ès-matières de discipline et correction ou autres 
pures personnelles, et non dépendentes de réalité’; the following Articles fix some fines in 
relation to this means of recourse. We also find rules on the appel comme d'abus in the 
Ordinance of Blois (1579)15, for example in Articles 59 and 60. The appellatio tamquam 
ab abusu is not mentioned in the important French Ordonnance civile pour la réformation 
de la justice (1667)16. This means of recourse was however a subject of discussion when 
the draft Ordinance was examined, shortly before its introduction, in order to see whether 
changes were necessary. References to the appel comme d'abus were made in relation to 
Article XXV.2. This Article deals with a court's refusal to pass judgment in cases subject 
to appeal which have reached the stage of judgment. It was a matter of debate whether this 
Article concerned ecclesiastical judges as well as the secular courts. According to one 
opinion this was indeed the case, and it was held that under such circumstances appel 
comme d'abus could be lodged, whereas according to another opinion it was doubtful 
whether indeed this Article applied to the ecclesiastical judge as well. After the last 
opinion it was not clear whether a refusal to pass judgment could be viewed as abus giving 
rise to appel comme d'abus. In the end the Article was introduced without major changes. 
 
9 EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu (n. 4), p. 52. 
10 HALLEBEEK, Recursus ad Principem (n. 3), p. 66 n. 9; VAN STIPHOUT, Van de paus of van de 
koning? (n. 5), p. 105 
11 The text of this ordinance can be found in F. ISAMBERT et al. (eds.), Recueil général des anciennes lois 
françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu'à la Révolution de 1789, vol. XI: 1483-1514, Paris, 1827, p. 214 ss. 
12 EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu (n. 4). p. 50. 
13 EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu (n. 4), p. 42 ss. 
14 The text of this ordinance can be found in ISAMBERT et al. (eds.), Recueil général des anciennes lois 
françaises (n. 11), vol. XII: 1514-1546, Paris, s.a., p. 600 ss. 
15 The text of this ordinance can be found in ISAMBERT et al. (eds.), Recueil général des anciennes lois 
françaises (n. 11), vol. XIV: 1555-1589, Paris, s.a., p. 380 ss. 
16 The text of this ordinance can be found in ISAMBERT et al. (eds.), Recueil général des anciennes lois 
françaises (n. 11), vol. XVIII, 1661-1671, Paris, s.a., p. 103 ss. 
It seems that it was the intention of the French legislature to have the appel comme d'abus 
dealt with in a separate ordinance17 which, however, was never introduced. Legislation on 
the equivalent of appel comme d'abus in the Low Countries (cassation) is also unknown to 
me. 
The appel comme d'abus was used (a) where the ecclesiastical authorities exceeded their 
jurisdiction, appropriating to themselves the powers of the secular authorities (such abus 
was known as ‘usurpation de pouvoir’, ‘attentat’ or ‘enterprise’) and (b) when 
ecclesiastical authorities abused their jurisdiction (such abus was termed ‘excès de 
pouvoir’ or ‘violence’)18. Theoretically, the appeal could also be lodged where secular 
authorities arrogated to themselves powers which belonged to the Church19, but whether 
this ever occurred in practice is doubtful20. The latter rule had most likely been introduced 
in order to appease the Church so as not to give it the impression that the appellatio ab 
abusu was a unilateral measure aimed only at the jurisdiction of the Church21. 
According to the writings of Van Espen, appellatio ab abusu could be lodged against 
papal rescripts which clashed with the canons or concordats or anything else which a 
bishop or an ecclesiastical judge might have ordered to nullify secular jurisdiction, royal 
legislation, the prerogatives of the national Church or the privileges of the States22. This 
coincides with the teachings of the so-called Libertés de l'Eglise gallicane (1594) by Pierre 
Pithou23, where the cases in which the appel was allowed are described as follows (see 
Article 79): 
 
quand il y a enterprise de iurisdiction ou attentat contre les saincts decrets et canons receus 
en ce royaume [de France], droits, franchises, libertez et privilèges de l'Eglise gallicane, 
concordats, edicts et ordonnances du Roy, arrests de son Parlement; bref, contre ce qui est 
non seulement de droit commun divin ou naturel, mais aussi des prerogatives de ce 
Royaume, et de l'Eglise d'iceluy. 
 
It is evident that this enumeration is not very detailed. The specific cases in which appel 
comme d'abus was allowed were never fixed24. In the Procès-verbal des conférences 
tenues par ordre du roi, pour l’examen des articles de l'ordonnance civile du mois d'avril 
166725 (the important Ordinance on civil procedure promulgated under the reign of Louis 
XIV mentioned above) some remarks on this subject are made26. It is said that nothing was 
more contrary to the laws of the kingdom of France than limiting the appellations comme 
d'abus to specific cases. It is also stated that in the past clerics had often asked for a 
specific enumeration of those cases in which appel comme d'abus could be lodged. 
 
17 Procès-verbal des conférences tenues par ordre du roi, pour l’examen des articles de l'ordonnance civile 
du mois d'avril 1667 [...], Paris, 1776. 
18 EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu (n. 4), p. 58. 
19 P. PITHOU, Libertés de l'Eglise gallicane, in ID., Preuves des libertez de l'Église gallicane, Paris, 1651, 
P. I, Art. 80. 
20 EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu (n. 4), p. 57. 
21 Ibid. 
22 HALLEBEEK, Recursus ad Principem (n. 3), p. 68. See also LECLERC, Van Espen et l'autorité 
ecclésiastique (n. 4), p. 245. 
23 This collection of Libertés, drafted on private initiative, was soon considered to have official status in 
France. See CARON, L'appello per abuso (n. 7), p. 70 n. 206: ‘[q]uesta raccolta, formulata con carattere 
privato, acquistò tosto autorità ufficiale, venendo quindi ad assumere, nel diritto ecclesiastico francese, una 
posizione analoga a quella del Decretum Gratiani nel Corpus Juris Canonici’. 
24 EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu (n. 4), p. 59. 
25 Procès-verbal des conférences tenues par ordre du roi (n. 17). 
26 Procès-verbal des conférences tenues par ordre du roi (n. 17), p. 360 ss. See the remarks concerning 
Article XXV. 
However, each time they had received the reply that such cases could not be defined in any 
way other than by saying that they should be cases against the freedoms of the Gallican 
Church, the holy canons received in France, against the laws of the kingdom and the 
authority of the king. Furthermore, it is stated that the courts were to consider each 
particular case on its merits. 
When a case was brought before the secular court by way of appel comme d'abus this 
resulted in a stay of execution of the ecclesiastical proceedings. As mentioned earlier, the 
Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts (1539) limited this stay of execution to cases which did not 
concern ‘matières de discipline et correction ou autres pures personnelles, et non 
dépendantes de réalité’27. 
A successful appellatio tamquam ab abusu did not lead to a judgment replacing the 
earlier decision of the ecclesiastical authorities, but only to the ecclesiastical decision being 
quashed. In practice, however, this rule was ignored: the French secular courts often 
supplied the plaintiff with a new decision28. 
Although the French secular authorities tried to limit the use of appel comme d'abus29, 
we find this appeal occurring so often in French practice that it must have severely reduced 
the powers of the Church. Eichmann even designates the appel comme d'abus as ‘das 
Mittel, um die kirchliche Jurisdiktion, Gesetzgebung und Rechtsprechung [...] lahm zu 
legen’30. It resulted in many ecclesiastical cases, even those falling under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Church, being brought before secular courts. This was especially 
alarming for the Church when the courts did not limit themselves to quashing the 
ecclesiastical decision, but also furnished the applicant with a new judgment. 
 
 
2. Possessory Remedies 
 
Possessory actions before the secular courts concerning ecclesiastical matters, especially 
those dealing with benefices (maintenue in the Low Countries and complainte in France; in 
the Low Countries complainte was applied only in secular matters), are occasionally 
viewed as a particular type of appel comme d'abus. In a recent article, Van Stiphout 
maintains to this point of view31. According to Michel Nuttinck maintenue and cassation 
(i.e. appel comme d'abus) do not constitute two remedies which can be adequately 
distinguished from one another. Nuttinck states that they share many features and that he 
has not found with Van Espen the basis for an adequate distinction between the two reme-
dies. Maintenue presupposes a cassation; and the cassation is usually accompanied by 
maintenue, claims Nuttinck32. Nevertheless, in my opinion these remedies should be 
distinguished sharply, at least from a theoretical perspective. 
It should be remembered that in cases of appel comme d'abus we find ecclesiastical 
matters being brought before the secular judge33. This is different where possessory 
remedies are concerned. From the perspective of many medieval and early-modern 
authors, possessory actions, even those concerning ecclesiastical property, were a secular 
 
27 The text of this ordinance can be found in ISAMBERT et al. (eds.), Recueil général des anciennes lois 
françaises (n. 14), p. 600 ss. 
28 EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu (n. 4), p. 64. 
29 R. NAZ, Appel comme d'abus, in DDC 1 (1935) 818-827. 
30 EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu (n. 4), p. 55. 
31 VAN STIPHOUT, Van de paus of van de koning? (n. 5), pp. 100-101. 
32 NUTTINCK, La vie et l'ceuvre de Van Espen (n. 5), p. 491 n. 457. 
33 CARON, L'appello per abuso (n. 7), p. 86, states that the application of the appel comme d'abus ‘si 
risolveva in uno sconfinamento totale da parte della magistratura regia nel campo proprio dell'autorità 
ecclesiastica’. 
affair. According to Robert-Joseph Pothier, for example, it may well be that benefices are 
an ecclesiastical matter. Nevertheless, the conservation of the possession of the owner of 
the benefice belongs to the ‘police extérieure’, ‘l'ordre public’ and the ‘puissance 
séculière’. This ‘puissance’ was established by God himself, says Pothier, for the conserva-
tion of public order in all the constituent parts of the State, of which the Church is a part34. 
Evidently at this point Pothier strictly adheres to the teachings of the Gallican Church. In 
order to support his opinion he quotes Charles Dumoulin, who stated that: ‘[...] all 
possessory actions and related matters have a temporal character and belong to the jurisdic-
tion of the secular court, not to that of the ecclesiastical court. In cases concerning 
benefices, possession is dealt with before the secular judge, because in a possessory matter 
attention is not devoted to a spiritual matter in a spiritual way’ (‘[.. .] omne possessorium et 
omnis causa possessoria temporalis est et secularis, non ecclesiastici fori. In beneficialibus 
et spiritualibus causis, possessorium coram judice seculari tractatur; quia, quum agitur de 
possessorio, de re spirituali non spiritualiter agitur’)35. Similar views were expressed by 
other authors. M.A. Rodier, for example, in his Questions sur l'Ordonnance de Louis XIV, 
du mois d'avril 1667 holds that possession is a purely factual matter and completely 
temporal; consequently cognizance of possessory actions belongs in his opinion to secular 
judges, and all the more because they alone to the exclusion of ecclesiastical judges, have 
the ‘puissance c[o]ercitive’, that is to say, the right to suppress the factual disturbance of 
possession (‘de contenir et de réprimer les voies de fait ‘)36. This author, like many others, 
refers to a bull granted to the French king by Pope Martin V. Hallebeek37 states that here 
the bull Apostolicae Sedis, promulgated on May 1st, 1429, is meant. This bull is mentioned 
in one of the decisiones of Guy de la Pape38. In it, Pope Martin assures King Charles VII, 
that he certainly had no intention of derogating from the rights and jurisdiction of the King 
of France. This bull was interpreted in such a manner that the secular courts were entitled 
to continue to take cognizance of possessory actions regarding benefices. 
In short, possessory actions were considered to be a secular affair because they touched 
upon public order39. In my opinion, therefore, bringing a possessory case before a secular 
court was different from lodging an appel comme d'abus, since theoretically possessory 
matters did not belong to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, as was the case with 
many issues which were brought before the secular judge by way of appel comme d'abus. 
However, this view was not always shared by the Church, as is apparent from many 
instances, for example from an Ordinance originating in the Low Countries dated June 
10th, 1534. In this Ordinance we find that it had come to the knowledge of Emperor 
Charles V that some litigants brought actions against inhabitants of the Low Countries 
before the court in Rome in order to challenge judgments in possessory matters passed by 
the Emperor's judges. All of these cases concerned dignities and benefices situated in the 
Low Countries. The papal judges delegate took cognizance of them without being willing 
to stop the proceedings, something they would have done if they had considered 
possessory actions concerning benefices to be a secular matter40. 
 
34 R.-J. POTHIER, Traité de la procédure civile, ed. M. DUPIN AINÉ, Œuvres de R.-J. Pothier, contenant 
les traités du droit français, Bruxelles, 1832, vol. VI, p. 62[II. III. 5. 2]. 
35 Charles Dumoulin as quoted by POTHIER, Traité de la procedure civile (n. 34), p. 62 [II. III. 5. 2]. 
36 M.A. RODIER, Questions sur l'ordonnance de Louis XIV, du mois d'avril 1667, Toulouse, 1777, p. 246. 
37 J. HALLEBEEK, The possessory remedy of rnaintenue. Origin and application by the Court of Utrecht, 
in B.C.M. JACOBS & E.C. COPPENS (eds.), Een Rijk Gerecht. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. mr. P.G. 
Nève (RRGNI. 41), Nijmegen, 1998, pp. 193-214, esp. 201-202. 
38 Cf. HALLEBEEK, The possessory remedy of maintenue (n. 37), p. 202. 
39 HALLEBEEK, The possessory remedy of maintenue (n. 37), p. 197. 
40 LAMEERE (ed.), Recueil des ordonnances des Pays-Bas (n. 2), pp. 446-447. 
Although possessory remedies and appel comme d'abus must be sharply distinguished 
from a theoretical perspective, it cannot be denied that they are closely related: they may 
coincide in a number of cases. According to Eichmann, for example, abuse of ecclesiastical 
power was present (at least in France) where ‘bei Besetzung der Beneficien die staatlichen 
Vorschriften nicht beachtet worden waren’41. In this case, the decision concerning the 
filling of the vacant benefice could be quashed by way of appel comme d'abus. At the 
same time one can envisage a possessory action being brought by the person who was enti-
tled to the benefice against the person who had been wrongly provided with it. 
As stated above, in the Low Countries the possessory action to be brought before the 
secular court in ecclesiastical affairs was known as (ecclesiastical) maintenue. As 
Hallebeek noted, it has been a matter of debate among modern authors (including myself) 
as to whether or not the action of maintenue as applied in the Low Countries was of indige-
nous origin. In my Ph.D. thesis42 I noted that Philips Wielant in his 16th century Practijke 
civile43 (a Flemish treatise on civil procedure) contradicts himself when he claims both that 
maintenue originated in France (I.XII.4) and that in France only two possessory remedies 
(complainte and simple saisine), excluding maintenue, existed (I.VI.5). Because I did not 
find the action of maintenue mentioned in studies on the French royal courts, I concluded 
that Wielant was wrong when he referred the origin of this action to France. Hallebeek did 
not agree with my point of view in his article The possessory remedy of maintenue44. In 
this article, the learned author concludes that the origin of maintenue most likely does lie in 
France. However, he states that a technical name for it did not exist. Hallebeek also claims 
that in France complainte was never used for possessory protection of prebends 
(benefices). This latter view can, however, be shown to be incorrect. The applicability of 
complainte in cases concerning benefices is, for example, clear from Article 61 of the 
Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts (1539), which reads: ‘Qu'il ne sera reçu aucune complainte 
après l'an, tant en matières prophanes que bénéficiales, le défendeur mesme n'ayant titre 
apparent sur sa possession’45. It seems likely, however, that Hallebeek is correct when he 
states that maintenue originated in France. In my opinion, the action known as 
(ecclesiastical) maintenue in the Low Countries was considered to be a particular type of 
complainte in France. This is shown by the similarities between these two types of action. 
One of the main similarities between (ecclesiastical) maintenue and (ecclesiastical) 
complainte is the plaintiff's obligation to submit his title to the benefice concerned46. The 
submission of a title was not required when the secular equivalents of these actions were 
brought. According to Jean Domat47 this resulted from the fact that, unlike ownable secular 
property, which could be possessed by everyone and which could be acquired in many 
ways, benefices could only be possessed by persons who had the required capacity and 
who had been furnished with the benefice in the manner prescribed by ecclesiastical law. 
 
41 EICHMANN, Der recursus ab abusu (n. 4), p. 61. 
42 C.H. VAN RHEE, Litigation and Legislation. Civil Procedure at First Instance in the Great Council for 
the Netherlands in Malines (1522-1559) (Studia, 66), Brussels, 1997, p. 227. 
43 F. WIELANT, Practycke civile, [Thantwerpen, 1573], ed. E.I. STRUBBE (Fontes Iuris, Batavi Rariores, 
3), Amsterdam, 1968. 
44 HALLEBEEK, The possessory remedy of maintenue (n. 37), p. 197 ss. 
45 The text of this ordinance can be found in ISAMERT et al. (eds.), Recueil général des anciennes lois 
françaises (n. 14), p. 600 ss. 
46 ISAMBERT et al. (eds.), Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises (n. 16), p. 103 ss.: Ordonnance 
civile touchant la réformation de la justice (1667), Art. 2. The same rule appears implicitly in the 
Ordonnances de Montils-les-Tours (1453), to be found in ISAMERT et al. (eds.), Recueil général des 
anciennes lois françaises (n. 11), vol. IX: 1438-1462, p. 202 ss. 
47 J. DOMAT, Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel, Paris, 1777, III. 7.1.15 note u. 
A second similarity concerns the period of time during which the benefice needed to 
have been in the possession of the person who brought the possessory action. In the Low 
Countries complainte could only be brought where possession for a year and a day of the 
object or right concerned could be proven. In cases of maintenue, on the contrary, it 
sufficed to show a title (canon institution) and actual possession48. In France, such a 
distinction was also made, even though in both cases the action to be brought was called 
complainte. This appears, for example, where Pothier states: ‘Elle [la complainte en 
matière bénéficiale] diffère des complaintes en matière profane [...] en ce qu'au lieu que la 
possession d'an et jour destituée de titre suffit pour celle-ci, au contraire, la complainte en 
matière bénéficiale n’est accordée qu'au bénéficier qui possède en vertu d'un titre’49. 
Apparently, for ecclesiastical complainte possession for a year and a day was not required. 
All of this makes it very likely that the action known as (ecclesiastical) maintenue in the 
Low Countries was equivalent to ecclesiastical complainte in France. Hence, Hallebeek 
may have been right when he located the origin of maintenue in France. It seems likely 
however, that the habit of using the name maintenue to designate the action called 
ecclesiastical complainte in France originated in the Low Countries. This may well have 
been the result of the fact that in the definition of complainte the word maintenue played a 
crucial role. To give but one example: Rodier in his Questions sur l'Ordonnance de Louis 
XIV, du mois d'avril 1667 defines cases concerning ecclesiastical complainte as follows: 
‘Ce sont les instances ou procès ou il s'agit de la maintenue en la possession d'un 
benefice’50. 
Before concluding this part of my paper, it should be emphasized that by the time of Van 
Espen an important difference between (ecclesiastical) maintenue in the Low Countries 
and (ecclesiastical) complainte in France had come into existence. This shows that the 
French secular authorities had gone further than those in the Low Countries in curbing the 
power of the Church. This difference concerned the right to bring a petitory action (an 
action to claim ownership) after or during possessory litigation. 
The situation in the Low Countries was that petitory litigation was indeed possible. 
Petitory actions concerning benefices did not, however, belong to the jurisdiction of the 
secular courts. They had to be brought before the ecclesiastical judge. The latter was not 
allowed to hear a petitory action before the possessory action had resulted in a final 
judgment, and until this judgment had been complied with or had been enforced51. 
By the start of the 17th century, the situation in France, although originally similar to 
that in the Low Countries52, had changed completely. There the jurisdiction of the 
ecclesiastical judge was curbed in that it was decided that after possessory judgments 
concerning benefices had been pronounced no petitory actions were to be allowed53. If, 
nevertheless, such petitory actions were brought, this could give rise to appel comme 
d’abus54. The reason for this situation was that in ecclesiastical actions concerning 
possession the judgment was the result of an inspection of titles. It was argued that on the 
basis of such inspection the question as to who was entitled to the benefice was decided 
beyond doubt. 
 
 
48 WIELANT, Practycke civile (n. 43), I. XIII. 3-4. 
49 POTHIER, Traité de la procédure civile (n. 34), p. 62 [II. III. 5. 1]. 
50 RODIER, Questions sur l'ordonnance de Louis XIV (n. 36), p. 245. 
51 VAN RHEE, Litigation and Legislation (n. 42), p. 258. 
52 Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts (1539), Art. 49, to be found in ISAMBERT et al. (eds.), Recueil général des 
anciennes lois françaises (n. 14), p. 600 ss. 
53 D. Jousse, Nouveau commentaire sur l’ordonnance civile du mois d'avril 1667, Paris, 1767, p. 215 [Art. XV. 7]. 
54 Ibid. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
In the present paper I have focussed on legal instruments used during the Ancien Régime 
for limiting and controlling the power of the Church. Although some of these instruments, 
notably the appel comme d'abus, survived the French Revolution for some time, they have 
by now become an historical phenomenon. Nevertheless, their application in the past 
remains important from an historical perspective, in that it shows us that law is not a 
neutral, technical phenomenon. Van Espen is a good example of a lawyer who realised that 
law may be applied to further political ideas. He served his own ‘Jansenist’ cause by 
applying the legal instruments available at his time. In order to understand Zeger-Bernard 
Van Espen's ideas in detail, some legal background information is needed. I hope to have 
provided this information in this contribution. 
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